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Abstract
This paper shows how persistent world in°ation shocks hitting a small open economy
can re-weight the importance of domestic and foreign factors in the determination of prices.
In particular, we study why a global disin°ation environment may imply a weakening of the
channels whereby domestic shocks a®ect in°ation. We derive a state-dependent Phillips
curve based on translog preferences that make the elasticity of substitution of domestic
goods sensitive to foreign prices. With this approach we are able to replicate this dragging
e®ect of global disin°ation on domestic in°ation. We also provide empirical evidence from
a wide panel of countries to support the signi¯cance of such an e®ect.
JEL Classi¯cation: E31, E52.
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11 Introduction
Compared to decades gone, many economies are nowadays characterized by low in°ation envi-
ronments. As pointed out by Andersen and Wascher (2000), Bowman (2003) and Rogo® (2003),
there are several reasons behind this global disin°ation scenario, for instance institutional fac-
tors such as increasing central bank independence, strong commitments to anti-in°ationary
policies, and the increased competitiveness hypothesis in price setting behavior. According
to this hypothesis, both the rising globalization and deregulation witnessed worldwide in the
90s have contributed to the fall in the market power of price setting ¯rms. As a result, in°a-
tion rates have reached unusual low levels (even below targets) and seem to remain very low,
barely reacting to expansionary monetary policies. This fact has been remarkable in small
open economies such as Latin American countries since the mid 90s1.
There are at least two ways to tackle the increased competitiveness hypothesis. The ¯rst is
related to the behavior of markups vis-a-vis in°ation. A pioneering result o®ered in Rotemberg
and Woodford (1991) for a close economy is that aggregate markups are counter-cyclical2. This
contrasts the views in Taylor (2000) and Jonsson and Palmqvist (2003) for open economies,
where lower in°ation rates imply lower market power. In general, the markup debate is not
conclusive.
A convenient alternative route of analysis is to leave aside the behavior of markups and note
that the increased competitiveness hypothesis also relies on the rising number of good varieties
faced by consumers due to globalization. The implication of this casual observation is that
consumers are more prone to substitute away their consumption towards newer and cheaper
goods3. As stated by Rogo® (2003, pg. 18), \(...) sharp reductions in [tradable goods] prices
are bound to create spillover e®ects on other sectors. Many traded goods are intermediate
goods or, to some degree, substitutes for non-traded goods" (the emphasis is ours).
The usual modeling tool for in°ation dynamics is the well-known New Keynesian Phillips
Curve4. Under this approach, it is common to assume that the demands for goods produced
by monopolistic ¯rms arise from Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) preferences, which
seems to be an inappropriate assumption within the increased competitiveness context. The
contribution of this paper hinges precisely on modeling a simple mechanism explaining the
change in the substitutability between foreign and home goods and its implications for aggre-
gate in°ation dynamics. For this purpose we follow Bergin and Feenstra (2000, 2001) and rely
on translog preferences leading to a state-dependent Phillips curve for a small open economy.
The advantage of the translog speci¯cation over the widely used CES counterpart is that it
allows the demands for goods to depend on the prices of other goods and thereby making the
price elasticity of domestically produced goods dependent on price movements elsewhere.
In the light of this type of preferences, a global environment characterized by frequent disin-
1Country speci¯c examples can be found in Rogo® (2003).
2This means that booms represent periods of falling market power whereas recessions picture episodes of
rising market power. B¶ enabou (1992) and Banerjee and Rusell (2004) also ¯nd the negative relationship.
3See Kamada and Hirakata (2002) for an empirical overview of the increased competitiveness phenomenon
for the Japanese economy. For the USA, Broda and Weinstein (2004) ¯nd that import prices have fallen faster
than what o±cial statistics suggest due to the increase in the imported goods varieties.
4See Clarida et al. (1999).
2°ation shocks5, induces a strong strategic complementarity, namely, home producers having to
optimally follow up the world (downward) in°ation trend6. The identi¯cation of this dragging
e®ect of world in°ation results crucial for the understanding of the transmission mechanisms
of monetary policy in small open economies. Once home in°ation has been pushed down
severely, monetary policy has a mixed blessing: on one hand, it can enjoy the bene¯t of low
world in°ation and on the other hand, it will soon ¯nd that pushing up in°ation with its stan-
dard domestic interest rate instrument gets harder and harder. One obvious way to push up
in°ation in such circumstances is to use the one channel that gets stronger: the pass-through
from the exchange rate to in°ation, precisely the way central banks might less be willing to be
heading for.
Before proceeding, it is important to have a better grasp of the di®erences between the
dragging and the pass-through e®ects. For a small open economy, world in°ation °uctuations
quickly hit tradable goods prices which are then - albeit with lags - aggregated out to a®ect
overall in°ation. This is the well-known pass-through e®ect7 which does not directly impact
on non-tradable goods pricing. In contrast, if world in°ation also a®ects non-tradable goods
prices, due to a substitution e®ect, the consequences for overall in°ation are stronger. We dub
this impact as the dragging e®ect.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops partial-equilibrium Phillips
curve derivations based on both the CES and the translog aggregator. Section 3 provides some
empirical evidence to support the increased competitiveness hypothesis and the dragging e®ect
using a wide panel of countries. In Section 4 we perform world disin°ation experiments with
a stylized general equilibrium model to study the e®ects on the variables of interest and on
the power of monetary policy to a®ect in°ation8. Section 5 contains our ¯nal remarks and
suggests some lines of further research.
2 The state-dependence of the Phillips curve
The above discussion recalls the recurrent debate about the non-linearity of the Phillips curve.
As pointed out by Dupasquier and Ricketts (1998), several models of price-setting behavior sug-
gest that the parameters of the Phillips curve are functions of macroeconomic conditions9 such
as the level of in°ation and, in an open economy, the real exchange rate10. These non-linearities
may lessen the accuracy of the traditional CES-based New Keynesian Phillips curve as a sen-
sible modeling tool, particularly in small economies with signi¯cant disin°ation episodes.
5For example, the constant appearance of cheap foreign products competing with local ones or the constant
innovation in information-based products.
6See Bakshi et al. (2003) for a discussion on strategic complementarities in the presence of trend in°ation.
7See Goldfjan and Werlang (2000) for a review of the pass-through literature.
8The term monetary policy power does not refer to the power to a®ect aggregate demand but the power to
a®ect in°ation.
9Amongst the most popular explanations of such asymmetries are signal extraction or misperceptions, ad-
justment costs, downward nominal wage rigidities and the presence of monopolistically competitive markets.
More details can be found in Ball et al. (1988) and King and Watson (1994).
10Another important condition for an open economy is studied in Lougani et al. (2001). They analyze why
countries with greater restrictions on capital mobility tend to have steeper Phillips curves.
3In this section we analyze the relationship between the relative price of tradables to non-
tradables11 and the importance of domestic factors to explain in°ation. The goal is to provide
a theoretical framework to endogenize the dragging e®ect. Throughout the document, lower
cases of both real quantities and prices refer to the natural logarithms of the respective upper
cases. Also, the h and w subscripts refer to home and world variables, respectively. Variables
with no subscripts are aggregate ¯gures. The details of the analytical derivations are outlined
in the Appendix.
The framework set up here tries to be as simple as possible. The aim is to build a partial
equilibrium model to derive microfounded in°ation equations to be empirically tested in Section
3 and to be used for monetary policy analysis in Section 4. The emphasis is on aggregation
features generated from two alternative assumptions about consumer preferences, with di®erent
implications concerning the substitutability among goods and in turn, di®erent e®ects on the
Phillips curve parameters. We work with two types of goods - a home, non-tradable good and
a world, tradable good - which enter into the consumption basket according to either a CES
(which will be treated as a benchmark) or translog aggregator.
The price of the world good obeys the law of one price. That is, if P¤
t denotes the in-
ternational price of the world good and St is the nominal exchange rate, then the domestic
currency price of this good is Pw;t = StP¤
t and its in°ation is ¼w;t = ¢st + ¼¤
t: World in°ation
is exogenous and follows a simple AR(1) process,
¼¤
t = (1 ¡ ½)¼ + ½¼¤
t¡1 + ²t with ²t » iid (1)
where j½j < 1 and ¼ is the steady-state world in°ation rate.
On the other side, to model stickiness in home prices, we adopt the cost-of-changing-prices
setup of Rotemberg (1982). This approach consists ¯rst in ¯nding desired prices, as if having
¯rms operating in a °exible price environment and then introducing costs of adjustment to
move observed prices towards the optimal ones.
Two simplifying assumptions are made to derive analytically tractable in°ation equations.
The ¯rst one is the linearity of the home good production function. This assumption shuts o®
the direct demand e®ect on marginal costs and hence on prices12. Since this e®ect is virtually
the same under both aggregators, the gains from working with the standard concave production
function are negligible to our purpose. Moreover, provided that both preference assumptions
do not qualitatively make di®erence in the sensitive parts of marginal costs, we assume a given
labor demand. The second assumption is that we de¯ne real domestic wages in terms of the
home price rather than the consumption price. This allows us to derive in°ation equations
that are easy to handle and interpret, without altering the main conclusions of our model.
2.1 In°ation dynamics with a CES aggregator
Under the CES consumption aggregator, the consumption of the home good Ch;t depends
negatively on its own price Ph;t and positively on the aggregate consumption Ct. Speci¯cally,
11This ratio is the theoretical counterpart of the real e®ective exchange rate used in the empirical section.
12In the standard New-Keynesian Phillips curve, price dynamics is a®ected by real marginal cost movements,
which in turn, are a®ected by aggregate demand.
4ch;t = ln(1 ¡ ®) ¡ ´(ph;t ¡ pt) + ct (2)
where pt is the log aggregate CPI. In this equation ´ > 1 measures the degree of sub-
stitutability between the two goods and ® 2 h0;1i is usually interpreted as the degree of
openness.
It is easy to show that if the steady-state relative price Ph=Pw is equal to one, the consumer-
based price in°ation can be approximated by
¼t = (1 ¡ ®)¼h;t + ®¼w;t (3)
Overall in°ation does depend on ® but not on ´. Thus, under CES preferences, the degree
of goods substitutability plays no fundamental role on aggregate dynamics.
2.1.1 Home ¯rms and °exible price setting
The domestic good producer is endowed with monopolistic power and sets its price accordingly.
Production Yh;t is made with a technology that exhibits constant returns on labor. So, for given
nominal wages Wt, the total nominal costs are Ch(Yh;t) = WtYh;t.
Every period, the domestic producer chooses its price Ph;t to maximize pro¯ts,
B(Ph;t) = Ph;tYh;t(Ph;t) ¡ Ch(Yh;t(Ph;t)) (4)
subject to the equilibrium condition Yh;t = Ch;t. The optimal price decision reduces to the
standard markup pricing over marginal cost. If we take logs to the markup pricing equation we
obtain the working expression pces
h;t = ln(¹)+wt, where ¹ is the °exible-price markup ¹ =
´
´¡1.
As we note later, the di®erentiated expression for pces
h;t is a key variable that feeds into the
in°ation processes and is simply de¯ned as
¢pces
h;t = ¢wt (5)
2.1.2 Introducing price rigidity
Now suppose that ¯rms cannot set their desired optimal price due to the existence of adjustment
costs. As Rotemberg (1982), we assume that the monopolistic ¯rm maximizes pro¯ts net of
the loss it incurs by inducing variability in its price path.
We perform a quadratic approximation of (4) around the °exible price equilibrium (the
optimal price level in the absence of adjustment costs, pces
h;t). After introducing adjustment


















where ¯ 2 h0;1i is the ¯rm's discount factor, c > 0 and Et is the expectation operator.
















¢$t + »t (7)
where ¢$t is the growth of real wages de¯ned as $t = wt ¡ ph;t. The term »t is a
combination of iid forecast errors and is treated as a shock.
2.1.3 Aggregate in°ation
It is straightforward to plug (7) into the aggregator (3) to obtain
¼t = a0Et[¼t+1] + (1 ¡ a0)¼t¡1 + aslope¢$t + :::
::: + ®[¼w;t ¡ a0Et[¼w;t+1] ¡ (1 ¡ a0)¼w;t¡1] + a2»t (8)










and a2 = (1 ¡ ®).
The result is a standard hybrid Phillips curve with the following features: (i) it has a dy-
namic linear homogeneity property implying nominal neutrality in the long run; (ii) it depends
on the real marginal cost de¯ned by ¢$t and on the expectation shock »t; and (iii) it depends
on the world price in°ation.
Consider now a world in°ation shock (²0 = 1). According to (8) and (1), if we abstract from
nominal exchange rate or other endogenous movements, the response on impact14 of aggregate
in°ation is ®. In the absence of other perturbations the shock will be partially corrected in
the subsequent periods as ¼w;t reverts to its long-run value, due to the presence of the term
¡®(1 ¡ a0)¼w;t¡1. Further, it is useful to recall equation (7) and note that the shock per se
does not a®ect home prices15. Thus, world in°ation a®ects the aggregate in°ation by a direct
pass-through e®ect.
2.2 In°ation dynamics with a translog aggregator
With two consumption goods, the aggregate log price pt is de¯ned as





In this aggregator, the parameters ® 2 h0;1i and ° > 0 are such that both goods enter sym-
metrically in consumption preferences. Also, homogeneity in the demand functions is imposed.
Since the translog can be understood as an augmented CES aggregator16, the parameter ® is
the same as in (2).
13The solution of this type of dynamic problem has been neatly outlined in Sargent (1979) and applied to
in°ation dynamics by Batini et al. (2000).
14In the pre-shock period, ¼¡1 = ¢$¡1 = ¼w;¡1 = 0. The shock implies that ¼w;0 = 1 + ¢s0. Then,
the response on impact over in°ation is ¼0 = a0(1 ¡ ®)Et[¼h;1] + ®Et[¼w;1]) + ®(1 + ¢s0 ¡ a0Et[¼w;1]) =
a0(1 ¡ ®)Et[¼h;1] + ®(1 + ¢s0):
15In a general equilibrium setting, domestic in°ation would respond to changes in ¢$t generated, for instance,
by a policy reaction to the external shock.
16See Deaton and Muellbauer (1980).
6The log of the compensated demand for the domestic good is then
ch;t = ln(1 ¡ ® + °qt) ¡ (ph;t ¡ pt) + ct (10)
which di®ers from the demand under the CES speci¯cation in an important way: it depends
on the relative price of the world good to the home good, qt = pw;t ¡ ph;t.
Di®erencing equation (9) leads to aggregate in°ation
¼t = (1 ¡ ®t)¼h;t + ®t¼w;t (11)
This expression resembles equation (3) for the CES case. However, the weights are time-
varying now. In this case ®t = ® ¡ 1
2° (qt + qt¡1), so the in°ation process is a changing
weighted average of domestic and foreign in°ation17. As the relative price of the world good
falls, qt turns negative and therefore, world in°ation gradually becomes more important to the
determination of overall in°ation.
2.2.1 Home ¯rms and °exible price setting
Under translog aggregation, the non-tradable ¯rm takes into account the fact that the demand
for its good depends on the world good price. Then, the expression for the change in prices









Namely, the optimal price change ¢ptrans
h;t is an average of world in°ation and marginal
costs growth. A key fact of this price rule is that to prevent consumers from substituting away
the consumption of home goods, the home producer will ¯nd optimal to follow up the world
trend, so a falling world in°ation will drag home in°ation18.
2.2.2 Introducing price rigidity




















1 + ¯ + c
¶
¢$t + ³t (13)
where ³t is an iid shock.
This equation is quite di®erent from that in the CES case in (7). Particularly, home
in°ation now depends positively on world in°ation19.
17For the shares of either home or world good expenditure to be bounded between zero and one, we require
both ° and qt not to be too large. Empirically and for practical purposes, these conditions always hold.
18In the opposite case, when the world price increases, it is on the interest of the pro¯t-maximizing producer
to rise its price against the backdrop of a higher demand for the non-tradable good.
19The degree of dependence is captured by the adjustment cost parameter c. When adjustments costs are
high (c is small), the degree of dependence weakens and the situation is close to the CES case.
72.2.3 Aggregate in°ation
To aggregate the in°ation dynamics we plugged (13) into (11) to get
¼t = a0E [¼t+1] + a1¼t¡1 + (1 ¡ a0 ¡ a1)¼w;t + aslope;t¢$t + :::
::: + ®t [¼w;t ¡ a0Et [¼w;t+1] ¡ (1 ¡ a0)¼w;t¡1] + a2;t³t (14)















and a2;t = (1 ¡ ®t).
The above Phillips curve not only has the basic properties of (8) but also exerts more
interesting dynamics. The slope aslope;t depends negatively on ®t, the share of the imported
good in the consumption basket, whereas the pass-through coe±cient is directly related to ®t.
Since ®t increases as the relative price qt decreases, a drop of external prices (relative to home
prices) causes the slope of the Phillips curve to fall and the pass-through coe±cient to rise.
This result has an intuitive interpretation. In an open economy Phillips curve, the slope
parameter could be roughly interpreted as a measure of the importance of domestic factors in
the formation of prices. A fall in the price of tradables or a rise in the price of non-tradables
leads to demand substitution, implying a higher share of tradable goods in domestic expen-
diture. Under such circumstances, foreign shocks disturbing tradable prices would become
more important in equilibrium determination. As a result, the Phillips curve becomes more
elastic (its slope falls). This is also consistent with the negative correlation between qt and the
pass-through20.
Besides and perhaps more importantly, an external shock directly a®ects home price-setting,
magnifying the response of aggregate in°ation. Hence, in this case the pass-through e®ect of
world price °uctuations is reinforced by the existence of the dragging e®ect.
3 The dragging e®ect in the world
One important result of the previous section is the state-dependence of the Phillips curve
parameters in a context where a wider variety of goods become available for consumption.
Particularly, the theoretical model suggests that movements in the real exchange rate are
related to both the Phillips curve slope and the pass-through coe±cient in opposite ways. In
doing so, they continuously re-weight the contribution of domestic and foreign factors that
determine in°ation.
To provide some empirical basis for this point, in this section we perform Dynamic Panel
Data estimations for in°ation equations using a large set of countries. Next, we brie°y de-
scribe our preferred econometric methodology and present empirical evidence that supports
the existence of the dragging e®ect21.
20This result is in line with empirical ¯ndings in Goldfjan and Werlang (2000).
21The econometric discussion below is referential and does not attempt to be comprehensive. The interested
readers are referred to the articles that developed the estimators used in this document.
83.1 Speci¯cation and empirical hypothesis
Consider the in°ation equation




'q + 'xxj;t + 'w¼w
j;t
¢
¢qj;t + (´j + "j;t) (15)
where the subscripts j and t represent country and time period, respectively. The variable ¼j;t
stands for in°ation, xj;t is a measure of domestic real marginal costs, ¼w
j;t is foreign in°ation
expressed in domestic currency (external in°ation plus nominal depreciation) and ¢qj;t denotes
real depreciation. The error term is comprised by an unobservable, time-invariant country
speci¯c e®ect ´j and a random perturbation "j;t that is assumed to be serially uncorrelated.
Equation (15) is a °exible representation that tries to capture how in°ation is determined
among countries and especially to assess the importance of domestic factors (proxied by xj;t)
vis-a-vis external shocks (given by ¼w
j;t). Furthermore, it allows us to investigate whether
changes in the relative prices of goods (¢qj;t) not only a®ect in°ation but also introduce
non-linearities in price setting.
In fact, the companion coe±cient for xj;t, Áx + 'x¢qj;t, can be interpret as the Phillips
curve slope while Áw + 'w¢qj;t captures the pass-through of foreign to domestic prices. It
is clear that, by construction, both quantities are in°uenced by real exchange variations as
long as 'x 6= 0 and 'w 6= 0 , which is testable in a straightforward manner. Moreover, the
theoretical section states that, in the presence of the dragging e®ect, it should happen that
'x > 0 and 'w < 0 which is the main empirical hypothesis of this study.
3.2 Methodological Issues
Let Xj;t = [xj;t ¼w
j;t ¢qj;t xj;t¢qj;t ¼w
j;t¢qj;t] and µ0 = [Áx Áw 'q 'x 'w] so that equation (15)
can be conveniently rewritten as
¼j;t = Á¼¼j;t¡1 + µ0Xj;t + (´j + "j;t) (16)
To drop out country speci¯c e®ects, the regression equation is ¯rst-di®erenced so
¼j;t ¡ ¼j;t¡1 = Á¼ (¼j;t¡1 ¡ ¼j;t¡2) + µ0 (Xj;t ¡ Xj;t¡1) + ("j;t ¡ "j;t¡1) (17)
We require using instrumental variables to estimate (17) for two reasons. First, di®erencing
(16) introduces a correlation between (¼j;t¡1 ¡ ¼j;t¡2) and the new error term ("j;t ¡ "j;t¡1).
Second, most of the variables contained in Xj;t are very likely to be jointly determined with
in°ation (i.e. they are endogenous) so it is essential to allow for the possibility of simultaneity
or reverse causality22. Taking advantage of the dynamic nature of the data, the relevant
instruments consist of suitable lags of the levels of the explanatory and dependent variables.
Then, the following moment conditions should hold
E[¼j;t¡s("j;t ¡ "j;t¡1)] = 0
E[Xj;t¡s("j;t ¡ "j;t¡1)] = 0
(18)
22Foreign in°ation can be considered as strictly exogenous for small open economies. However, since ¼
w
j;t
includes nominal exchange rate °uctuations, it must be treated as endogenous.
9for t = 3;:::;T and s ¸ 2. The estimator that ful¯lls (18) is the well-known GMM Di®erence
Estimator developed in Arellano and Bond (1991). Although it properly accounts for the
endogeneity of regressors and is consistent, it has some statistical shortcomings. For instance,
Arellano and Bover (1995) show that the lagged levels of the explanatory variables are often
weak instruments (particularly in the presence of persistence) which could, in turn, lead to
asymptotic ine±ciency and biasness of the estimator.
To overcome such limitations, Arellano and Bover (1995) proposed an extended estimator,
fully developed in Blundel and Bond (1998), aimed to increase e±ciency. The idea is to jointly
estimate the original equations in levels (16) and the system in di®erences (17). This refers to
the GMM System Estimator, which should satisfy the following additional conditions23,
E[(¼j;t¡1 ¡ ¼j;t¡2)(´j + "j;t)] = 0
E[(Xj;t ¡ Xj;t¡1)(´j + "j;t)] = 0
(19)
The instruments for the system in levels are lagged di®erences of the explanatory and dependent
variables24 25.
The goodness of this GMM estimator depends on whether the selected instruments are
valid. To address this issue, we perform two speci¯cations tests as suggested in Arellano and
Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundel and Bond (1998). To test for the overall
validity of the instrument set, we ¯rst use a J test for overindentifying restrictions. Failure
to reject the null hypothesis gives support to the model. The second test examines if the
disturbances are serially correlated. The usual approach is to test whether the residuals for
the di®erenced-system are serially correlated. The rejection of the null hypothesis of absence
of serial correlation suggests a misspeci¯cation error to be solved by imposing di®erent, more
adequate moments conditions26.
3.3 Data and samples
We used annual data from the International Financial Statistics database (IFS May 2004) for
the 1980-2003 period and for 40 countries. Our panel is unbalanced mainly because of country
discrepancies in new data releases (some missing values in year 2003), historical data (the
23These conditions arise from the stationarity properties E [¼j;t¡p´j] = E [¼j;t¡k´j] and E [Xj;t¡p´j] =
E [Xj;t¡k´j] for all p and k. The assumption behind is that although is correlated with the levels of the
explanatory variables, there is no correlation between the former and the di®erences of the explanatory vari-
ables.
24Provided that lag levels are used as instruments in the di®erenced system, the only non-redundant instru-
ment for the levels system is the most recent di®erence. Details are in Blundel and Bond (1998).
25In the Dynamic Panel Data literature, the moment conditions are as exposed here and applied to each time
period to ensure a °exible structure for their covariance matrix [Ahn and Schmidt (1995)]. The result is an
instrument matrix whose width increases more than proportionally with T. In this study however, we work
with instruments for each variable and lag distance for all periods (i.e. the width of the instrument matrix
is independent of T) because the time-series dimension of our panel (T20) is considerably larger than what is
standard in the literature (T5). This approach not only reduces the computational demand of the estimation,
but also prevents the second-step estimates of the standard errors to be over¯tted.
26The di®erenced error ("j;t ¡ "j;t¡1) is expected to be ¯rst-order autocorrelated even if "j;t is uncorrelated
(otherwise, "j;t would follow a random walk). Second (or higher) order autocorrelation of the di®erenced residuals
indicates that is serially correlated of at least ¯rst order.
1080's) are unavailable for \new" countries such as the Czech Republic and, more importantly,
we have constrained the sample dropping observations with annual in°ation higher than 30
percent. We decide to exclude such observations because some countries in the sample pre-
sented hyperin°ationary episodes that may bias the results27. Overall, the full panel consists
of 833 observations (20.82 per country, on average).
The dependent variable in (15), ¼j;t, is the CPI percent change (line 64) which is available
for all countries. We then consider the growth in real GDP per worker as xj;t, since it was
the most homogenous approximation of real marginal cost available for all countries28. This
is computed as the di®erence between GDP Volume (line 99b) and employment (line 67e)29
growth rates. The real e®ective exchange rate (REER) as reported in the IFS (line 63) is
available for almost every country30 so ¢qj;t is directly computed31. Finally, foreign in°ation
expressed in domestic currency, ¼w
j;t, can be inferred from the REER and CPI data.
The countries included in the full sample are listed in Table 1. We also found convenient
to estimate (15) using three di®erent sub-samples (also listed in Table 1). First, since our
theoretical analysis refers to economies subject to external shocks, we consider the most open
economies in the sample. We ranked all countries according to the 1980-2003 average of the
imports plus exports to GDP ratio (the so-called openness ratio, lines 98c, 90c and 99b).
The median of this ratio over countries and time was roughly 60 percent, and we considered
those countries that present a mean ratio higher that 55 percent. The second sub-sample
corresponds to emerging market economies. This classi¯cation is useful since, according to
Rogo® (2003), these economies have shown over the sample the deepest structural reforms
related to deregulation and trade liberalization. Finally, we consider all the countries but
constrain the time span to the 90's (and the 2000's), since it is the decade when globalization
grew stronger and the global disin°ation began.
3.4 Estimation results
Estimations are displayed in Table 1. For each sample we estimated two versions of the
in°ation equation (15). The ¯rst constrains the coe±cients a®ected by the real depreciation
to zero ('q = 'x = 'w = 0), while the second is unrestricted. The purpose for such strategy
is to show the marginal e®ects of considering the in°uence of relative price °uctuations in the
in°ation equations.
27Although the decision is arbitrary, it responds to previous results in the in°ation-output trade-o® literature.
For instance, Ball et al. (1988) ¯nd that a high in°ation mean would tend to bias downwards the trade-
o® estimates. Additionally, Bakshi et al. (2003) and Ascari (2004) state that a Phillips curve-type in°ation
equation such as (15) is not a suitable way to model high-in°ation dynamics.
28We tried other measures of real marginal costs such as GDP or GDP per worker gaps. The results were
qualitatively similar than the one reported. However, they were not as statistically signi¯cant and appeared to
be sensitive to the detrending method.
29There were some missing observations for the number of employees in the middle of the panel. In such
cases, we ¯lled them by applying the growth rate of the labor force (line 67d) or the population growth (line
99z) in few cases, when labor force data were not available.
30For Brazil, Greece, Mexico, Peru and Thailand REER data are taken from the Economist Intelligence Unit
country database.
31The REER is measured as the ratio of the domestic currency price index of foreign goods to the domestic
price index, so an increase in the REER implies a real depreciation.
11With the full sample, it can be seen in the constrained in°ation equation (column 1) that
the coe±cients Áx and Áw are both positive and statistically signi¯cant. When augmenting
the model (column 2), there is some weak evidence of the dragging e®ect for all the countries
in the sample. The parameter of the real exchange rate a®ecting the mean of in°ation 'q is
negative and signi¯cant. However those a®ecting the Phillips curve parameters, albeit they
have the expected sign, are imprecisely estimated. The estimation suggests a di®use (positive)
e®ect of depreciation on the Phillips curve slope and no statistical e®ect on the pass-through
coe±cient.
When considering sub-samples, evidence switches in favor of the dragging e®ect. The
constrained in°ation equation for the most open economies (column 3) presents some mis-
speci¯cation problems, namely serial autocorrelation of residuals. The introduction of the real
depreciation and the other interaction terms (column 4) solves this issue while provides empir-
ical support to our hypothesis 'x > 0 and 'w < 0. Similar results are found for only emerging
markets data (columns 5 and 6), although the point estimate of Áx is not signi¯cant while
'x is statistically positive within a 90 percent con¯dence interval. Finally, the presence and
importance of the dragging e®ect is strong in the estimations when including all the countries
but constraining the time span since the beginning of the 90s (columns 7 and 8).
The above ¯ndings provide evidence of the real exchange as a determinant of the output-
in°ation tradeo® in small open economies. Moreover, they reveal that relative price °uctuations
have played an important role in the global disin°ation phenomenon of the 90s, by limiting
the importance of domestic shocks and increasing the in°uence of foreign shocks32.
4 Implications for monetary policy
Given that the fall in the slope of the Phillips curve originated from relative price °uctuations
ends up weakening a channel whereby domestic shocks a®ect in°ation, monetary policy may
lose e®ectiveness. Regardless of the expectation or exchange rate transmission mechanisms
implied in the Phillips curve, monetary policy also a®ects in°ation through marginal costs,
so the lower the slope is, the weaker the standard interest rate instrument becomes. In other
words, the power of the interest rate instrument is inversely related to the dragging e®ect of
world in°ation33.
We shall study this fact formally by including the two in°ation equations derived in Section
2 into a stylized model. Then, we shock the system to study policy implications.
32These results are complementary to those of Lougani et al. (2001). They ¯nd that countries with greater
restrictions on capital mobility have a steeper Phillips curve. A casual inspection of the data suggests that the
countries with stricter capital control have su®ered lower real depreciations in the sample period. However, a
re¯ned analysis would be needed to establish a more robust link between their results and ours.
33In an open economy, it is known that the degree of price stickiness is lower due to the presence of imported
goods and nominal exchange rate °uctuations. Since real e®ects of monetary policy shocks occur mainly because
of nominal rigidities, the decline of monetary policy e®ectiveness is a consequence of the decrease of overall price
stickiness implied by the dragging e®ect.
124.1 A simple framework
The model consists of six equations. The ¯rst is the law of motion of world in°ation de¯ned
in (1) while the second is a Phillips curve derived either for the CES (equation (8)) or the
translog (equation (14)) preferences.
The third equation, (20) below, establishes the link between the monetary policy interest
rate instrument it and the growth of real wages
¢$t = Et [¢$t+1] ¡ br(it ¡ Et [¼t+1] ¡ r) + ²$;t (20)
where r is the equilibrium real interest rate (assumed ¯xed) and br > 0. Typically this
equation is speci¯ed in terms of the output gap and is interpreted as an IS curve34. However,
in the absence of demand e®ects due to the assumed linearity of the production function,
marginal costs solely depend on the real wage rate. The important feature of equation (20) is
the negative relation between the real interest rate (gap) and the indicator of marginal cost
used in our setup.
Equation (21) describes a plausible monetary policy rule that incorporates a concern about
deviations of future expected in°ation rates from the target ¼ and the measure ¢$t
i = (r + ¼) + fp (Et [¼t+1] ¡ ¼) + f$¢$t + ²i;t (21)
where fp > 1 and f$ > 0.
Equation (22) is the de¯nition of the relative price process
qt = qt¡1 +
1
4
(¼w;t ¡ ¼h;t) (22)
Finally, exchange rate dynamics is embedded into the model in two alternative forms,
st = st¡1 ¡ Âqt¡1 PPP Model












We choose these alternatives given the fact that there is no macroeconomic consensus about
the correct nominal exchange rate model. However, despite our ignorance about how exchange
rate dynamics actually evolves, we will show that the dragging e®ect is robust to exchange rate
model uncertainty.
The two alternative speci¯cations in (23) represent two extremes regarding the way the
exchange rate adjusts to shocks. In the PPP model, the exchange rate moves only insofar as
the real exchange rate is misaligned (i.e. whenever there are deviations from purchasing parity
or disequilibria in the goods market). The parameter Â measures the speed of nominal exchange
rate adjustments to real exchange rate deviations from its zero long-run steady-state value.
Under this setting, the exchange rate shows smoother and somewhat persistent dynamics. Also
there will be no response to shocks on impact, since st depends on lagged values of qt.
In contrast, in the UIP case the spot exchange rate is a jump variable reacting to current
and future expected values of the interest rate di®erential, so that the non-arbitrage condition
34See Clarida et al. (1999)
13holds. To prevent for undue jumps in the spot exchange rate, we allow the world nominal
interest rate to move in response to world in°ation shocks. Insofar as domestic and world
interest rates will tend to move in the same direction, the spot exchange rate jump will not
be magni¯ed. This means that a falling world in°ation will decrease the world interest rate35.
In addition, the UIP model renders a more volatile exchange rate than the PPP model, with
a non-zero response on impact.
We assume arbitrary but reasonable values for the model coe±cients. We consider a steady-
state real interest rate r equal to 3 percent (which implies a value ¯ = 0:99) and a yearly
steady-state in°ation rate ¼ equal to 2.5 percent. For the world in°ation process, we make the
autoregressive parameter ½ = 0:5 which means that the e®ect of a shock dies away in about
a year. With respect to the aggregators, for both the CES and translog cases the parameter
that measures the degree of openness ® is set to 0:35. For the translog case, ° = 1. Finally,
the parameter c is set such that the slopes of both Phillips curves are equal in steady state36.
On the other hand, in equation (20) we set br = 0:2. In the policy rule (21), we choose the
values fp = 1:5 and f$ = 0:5. For the exchange rate PPP equation (23) we use Â = 0:36 which
implies a half-life of a misalignment of about a year. Finally, for the UIP model for exchange
rate we set f¤
p = fp½ = 0:75 (see footnote 34).
4.2 The exercise
We perform two experiments regarding the way world disin°ation may hit an economy initially
resting on its steady state37. We ¯rst evaluate a one-period-only disin°ation shock ²0 that
brings world in°ation from ¼ = 2:5 to 1 percent on impact. This shock will illustrate the
dynamics of the model. Second, we hit world in°ation such that the level of world in°ation
remains at 1 percent for a year (4 quarters)38 Through this type of persistent shock we try
to replicate the global disin°ation phenomenon. We then compare the responses of the model
variables under the two speci¯cations for the Phillips curve39. We perform this exercise with
the PPP model and then repeat the procedure with the UIP model.
4.2.1 The PPP Model
The results for in°ation are displayed in Figure 1 where the ¯rst row depicts the responses under
the one-quarter shock and the second, under the persistent one-year shock. The responses are
consistent with the reasoning laid out in the theoretical section above. The CES speci¯cation
produces a moderate fall while the translog case generates a deeper drop in aggregate in°ation.
35In fact, the term in braces in equation (23) states that the world interest rate is set by the policy rule i
¤
t =
(r + ¼) + fp (E [¼
¤
t+1] ¡ ¼) = (r + ¼) + fp½(¼
¤
t ¡ ¼) so f
¤
p = fp½. With this, we are assuming that both the
home and domestic policymakers have the same response to in°ation deviations.
36This means that if we set c









37To solve for the rational expectations equilibrium, we use the algorithm outlined in Klein (2000).
38To do this we simulate the model subject to the following history of world in°ation shocks: ²0 = 1 ¡ ¼,
²1 = ²2 = ²3 = (1 ¡ ½)²0 and ²j = 0 for j > 3.
39Additionally, we shocked the model considering di®erent sizes and signs for the shocks in order to exploit
the non-linearities in (14). Although we did ¯nd di®erences in the responses of the endogenous variables, none
of them were sizeable enough to be reported.
14The home in°ation behavior provides a better insight. We observe that it remains basically
unperturbed in the CES case while the translog home in°ation reacts in the same direction
as the world in°ation shock. In this case the falling world in°ation drags the home in°ation
down, a fact that becomes even more apparent under the persistent shock.
In Figure 2 we show the e®ect on other three key variables for monetary policy: the
real wage growth rate, the nominal interest rate and the nominal depreciation. Under both
types of shocks, the monetary policy rule calls for a stronger, expansionary response of the
policy instrument in the more disin°ationary environment, i.e the translog case. The stronger
response of interest rates in turn implies a stronger e®ect upon the real wage growth. It is
remarkable that although monetary policy performs in an unduly expansionary way, the e®ect
on in°ation is °imsy.
In Figure 3 we plot the reasons behind the weakening of monetary policy in the translog
setting: the e®ect of the shocks on the slope of the Phillips curve aslope;t and the pass-through
parameter ®t. Under both transitory and permanent shocks, the slope of the Phillips curve
co-moves with the relative price whereas the pass-through moves in the opposite direction.
Both, the reduction of the Phillips curve slope and the increase in pass-through reinforce the
dragging e®ect vis-a-vis the reduction of monetary policy power.
These results are in line with the two key features observed in the empirical part: the
positive correlation between the slope of the Phillips curve and the real exchange rate and the
negative correlation between the pass-through and this relative price.
4.2.2 The UIP Model
In Figures 4, 5 and 6 we present the responses of the di®erent variables under the UIP model.
It is important to recall that the main di®erence relative to the previous results is originated
in the response of the nominal exchange rate. As it can be seen, the shock causes a strong
depreciation on impact, since a cut in the interest rate as a policy reaction is anticipated.
The depreciation of the nominal exchange rate more than o®sets the shock so that the world
in°ation in domestic currency raises. Under translog preferences, this leads to an increase in
the domestic in°ation and, ¯nally, turns into a higher aggregate in°ation.
Nonetheless, after the shock, the dragging e®ect operates and the results are qualitatively
the same as the ones obtained in the PPP model. Note, however, that the depreciation
on impact under the persistent shock calls for a subsequent appreciation that magni¯es the
dragging e®ect of the disin°ation shock.
5 Final remarks
This paper provides a simple theoretical explanation of how world disin°ation might drag down
domestic in°ation in small open economies. In particular, we empirically ¯nd such an e®ect in
both open and emerging markets economies, especially during the last decade. We argue that
globalization and the increasing availability of cheaper foreign goods make world prices ever
more important to the price setting of domestic non-tradable goods. This is what we call the
dragging e®ect.
15The dragging e®ect causes the contribution of domestic factors on aggregate in°ation to
reduce due to demand substitution in favor of foreign goods. Since domestic expenditure in
tradable goods increases relative to that of non-tradables, the usual demand (interest rate)
channel of monetary policy also loses importance in the determination of prices. Thus, mone-
tary policy su®ers a loss of e®ectiveness to a®ect in°ation.
We argue that translog preferences are able to capture the strategic complementarity that
leads to the dragging e®ect. In our disin°ation experiments, translog preferences fare better
than the usual CES preferences, since the latter cannot replicate the follow up behavior in
price setting. To follow up is the best action home price setters can do to avoid loosing market
share in an increasingly competitive environment.
A natural extension of the paper is to move the model economy towards a more detailed
general equilibrium framework to better understand the impact of the dragging e®ect. For
instance, to have a better insight of the labor market and its relation to marginal costs. In this
case, a shock that pushes down the relative price of tradables to non-tradables might expand
the demand in the tradable sector and reduce that of the non-tradable sector. This could lower
non-tradable sector real wages (relative to those of the tradable sector) and hence reduce home
good prices, making the dragging e®ect even more pronounced than what is suggested here.
The existence of the dragging e®ect has important consequences for monetary policy in
small open economies, since it can lead the economy to a low-in°ation trap. In this circum-
stance, the direct interest channel is barely useful and the pass-through gains strength, so
policy makers may ¯nd convenient to induce exchange rate depreciation as a way out of the
trap.
Appendix
A Flexible price setting
A.1 The CES case

















where Ch;t and Cw;t denote the quantity of domestic and imported goods respectively.
Standard intratemporal choice condition for the home good implies






which is the version in levels of (2) in the main text.
After imposing the condition Yh;t = Ch;t and replacing Ch = WtYh;t and (25) in (4) we
obtain the pro¯t function












Wt, its percentage change being equation
(5).
A.2 The translog case
We ¯rst de¯ne the log expenditure function as a sum of log aggregate consumption and log
consumption-based price index, gt = pt +ct. Given that we are treating a two-goods case, the
price aggregator pt is de¯ned as equation (9), pt = (1 ¡ ®)ph;t + ®pw;t ¡
°
2 (pw;t ¡ ph;t)
2.













(1 ¡ ® + °qt) (27)
After replacing Gt = PtCt, we obtain the demand for the home good






which is the version in levels of (10). In this case, the pro¯t function is















Equation (30) cannot be solved explicitly for Ptrans
h;t since qt depends on ptrans
h;t = ln(Ptrans
h;t ).





















After di®erentiation of (32) we get equation (12) in the text.
B Price setting with adjustment costs
The quadratic approximation of the pro¯t function (4) around its desired price level P¤
h;t (either
































> 0. The linear term disappears due to the optimality
of P¤
h;t while the constant term is irrelevant to the ¯rms' decision-making.
On the other hand, the adjustment costs for price changes are given by cb (ph;t ¡ ph;t¡1)
2.
Therefore, in the presence of adjustment costs, the ¯rm pricing problem can be reformulated











































+ (Etph;t ¡ Etph;t¡1) ¡ ¯ (Etph;t+1 ¡ Etph;t) = 0 (36)
The operator Et is the expectation conditional on the information set accumulated up to
time t when the pricing decision is made. Equation (36) describes the optimal price plan of
the ¯rm. On the basis of the information set, the lagged price level ph;t¡1 is a predetermined
variable while the ¯rm sets ph;t = Etph;t which is actually observed. If we want to track the






+ (ph;s ¡ ph;s¡1) ¡ ¯ (Esph;s+1 ¡ ph;s) = 0 (37)
for s = t;t+1;:::. Due to rational expectations, the next period price forecasting error based
on this period information set is an iid sequence of random variable, Esph;s+1¡ph;s+1 = 2c
¯ »s+1.
Replacing and reordering conveniently yields
·
1 ¡

















where L denotes the lag operator, Ljph;t = ph;t¡j. Following Sargent (1979), the lag-
polynomial in brackets can be factorized as
·
1 ¡







= (1 ¡ ¸1L)(1 ¡ ¸2L) (39)
where the equalities ¸1 + ¸2 =
(2c+1+¯)
¯ and ¸1¸2 = 1
¯ hold.
The solution for the roots of this polynomial are such that 0 < ¸1 < 1 and ¸2 > 1
¯: one
stable solution and the other explosive. Upon inspection of the above two equations in ¸1 and
¸2, it is easy to verify that:
¯¸2
1 + 1 ¡ 2c¸1 = (1 + ¯)¸1 (40)
18Replacing the factorized polynomial and multiplying by (1 ¡ ¸2L)
¡1 allows us to get





























The transversality condition makes d = 0, so we can express the price decision as













This is the key solution to the problem. To derive an in°ation process, we forward (43)
one period, take time t expectations and multiply by ¯¸1,



















¼h;t = ¯¸1Et¼h;t+1 + ¸1¼h;t¡1 + 2c¸1¢p¤
h;t + iid (45)
The optimal price p¤
h;t depends on the consumption aggregator assumed.
B.1 The CES case
According to equation (5), ¢p¤
h;t = ¢pces
h;t = ¢wt = ¢$t + ¼h;t; so that equation (45), after





¼h;t = ¯¸1Et¼h;t+1 + ¸1¼h;t¡1 + 2c¸1¢$t + ¯¸1"t (46)
Considering equation (40) allows us to obtain equation (7) in the main text that does not
depend on ¸1 due to the assumed linearity of the production function. It is now straightforward
to aggregate the in°ation dynamics to get the overall in°ation rate using the aggregator in (3).

















19B.2 The translog case













¼h;t = ¯¸1Et¼h;t+1 + ¸1¼h;t¡1 + c¸1¼w;t + :::
::: + c¸1¢$t + ¯¸1"t (47)
Again, the equality (40) allows to simplify equation (47) into (13). Then, after aggregating
with (11) we get the time-varying Phillips curve (14).
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22Figure 1: In°ation responses to transitory and persistent shocks to world in°ation (PPP case).
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23Figure 2: Real wage growth, interest rate and exchange rate responses to transitory and
persistent shocks to world in°ation (PPP case).

































































































24Figure 3: Time-varying parameters with transitory and persistent shocks to world in°ation
(PPP case).



























































































25Figure 4: In°ation responses to transitory and persistent shocks to world in°ation (UIP case).
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26Figure 5: Real wage growth, interest rate and exchange rate responses to transitory and
persistent shocks to world in°ation (UIP case).

































































































27Figure 6: Time-varying parameters with transitory and persistent shocks to world in°ation
(UIP case).



























































































28Table 1: Estimation Results
Full sample Most open Emerging All Countries
economies markets in the 1990s
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Á¼ 0.229 0.163 0.146 0.164 0.229 0.153 0.189 0.214
(0.003) (0.005) (0.082) (0.108) (0.022) (0.006) (0.062) (0.021)
Áx 0.650 -0.029 0.414 -0.013 0.124 -0.027 0.587 -0.019
(0.219) (0.149) (0.110) (0.118) (0.164) (0.328) (0.234) (0.008)
Áw 0.518 0.871 0.544 1.007 0.564 0.918 0.402 0.993
(0.095) (0.091) (0.071) (0.008) (0.111) (0.062) (0.137) (0.066)
'¼ -0.965 -1.092 -1.056 -1.052
(0.085) (0.162) (0.059) (0.011)
'x 0.448 0.777 0.723 0.338
(0.248) (0.241) (0.351) (0.160)
'w -0.017 -0.362 -0.543 -0.022
(0.024) (0.074) (0.276) (0.007)
Observations 833 833 533 533 266 266 532 532
J test (p-value) 0.835 0.887 0.745 0.911 0.894 0.852 0.784 0.762
AR1 (p-value) 0.012 0.023 0.004 0.012 0.027 0.035 0.010 0.013
AR2 (p-value) 0.705 0.927 0.011 0.307 0.063 0.752 0.731 0.268
Samples:
Full sample: OECD countries excluding Korea, Luxemburg, Poland, Slovak Republic and Turkey; plus Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Israel, Malaysia, Morocco, Peru, Philippines, South Africa,
Thailand and Uruguay.
Most open economies (average openness ratio ¸ 0.55): exclude Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, France, Greece, Italy,
Japan, Mexico, Morocco, Peru, South Africa, Spain, UK, USA and Uruguay.
Emerging market economies : exclude OECD countries, Cyprus and Israel but include Mexico.
Notes:
Robust two-step standard errors are reported in parenthesis. These standard errors as well as the test statistics have been
corrected for ¯nite sample bias following Windmeijer (2004).
The J test for overidentifying restrictions is asymptotically distributed as Â2
k under the null of instrument validity, being
k the number of overidentifying restrictions. AR1 and AR2 tests for serial autocorrelation of the ¯rst-di®erenced residuals
are asymptotically standard normal under the null hypothesis of no serial autocorrelation.
All regressions include a constant. The instrument set consists of year dummies in all regressions, ¼j;k, xj;k, ¼w
j;k, ¢qj;k,
xj;k¢qj;k, ¼w







for the level equations.
29